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ABSTRACT
Sensitive computation oen has to be performed in a trusted exe-
cution environment (TEE), which, in turn, requires tamper-proof
hardware. If the computational fabric can be tampered with, we
may no longer be able to trust the correctness of the computation.
We study the idea of using computational platforms in space as
a means to protect data from adversarial physical access. In this
paper, we propose SpaceTEE – a practical implementation of this
approach using low-cost nano-satellites called CubeSats. We study
the constraints of such a platform, the cost of deployment, and dis-
cuss possible applications under those constraints. As a case study,
we design a hardware security module solution (called SpaceHSM)
and describe how it can be used to implement a root-of-trust for a
certicate authority (CA).
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Extremely sensitive computational operations, involving highly
secret data, require running on a computational platform that can
be trusted to maintain secrecy and computational integrity. A
common requirement from such a platform is to be tamper-proof,
meaning an adversary must not be able to change the way it works.
is property should be maintained across the stack, spanning
soware and hardware. Unless complicated and computationally
heavy cryptographic techniques from veriable computation are
used (see for example [22, 40]), the soware have to eventually
trust the hardware to perform operations correctly. In addition,
we would like to ensure that the inner state of the computer is not
visible to an adversary.
Assuming secure soware implementation, and a functionally
correct hardware design, we must prevent post-manufacturing
adversarial modications to the hardware, as well as physical access
to its components in order to read data from it.
Tamper-proof hardware is used in various products. One notable
example is Hardware Security Modules (HSM).
1.1 Hardware Security Modules
HSMs are used for generating and storing cryptographic keys, as
well as providing a restricted interface for performing well-dened
cryptographic operations, such as message signing and verication.
In Public-Key Infrastructures (PKI), HSMs are used by Certicate
Authorities (CA) to generate the signing keys, and to sign other
certicates. us, the private key never leaves the HSM hardware,
and is protected from soware aacks on the CA infrastructure.
However, via physical access to the HSM it may potentially be
possible to obtain its secrets. HSM vendors such as Safenet and
ales incorporate many precautions and preventative measures
to secure their hardware and make it tamper-proof. One defensive
measure is to protect them with sensors that identify an aempt
to open the HSM enclosure in order to access the board. e FIPS
140-2 US government standard [9] species the requirements for
cryptographic modules that protect sensitive (but unclassied) in-
formation for commercial uses.
FIPS 140-2 species 4 levels of security. e specication for
Level 4 states
”Physical security mechanisms provide a complete
envelope of protection around the cryptographic
module with the intent of detecting and respond-
ing to all unauthorized aempts at physical ac-
cess.”
as well as
”protects a cryptographic module against a secu-
rity compromise due to environmental conditions
or uctuations outside of the module’s normal op-
erating ranges for voltage and temperature.”
e National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST), Crypto-
graphic Module Validation Program (CMVP) periodically publishes
a Validated FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2 Cryptographic Modules list
[19]. Out of 332, only 13 comply with Level 4 physical security
requirements. We were unable to nd public pricing and specica-
tions for Level 4 devices, however Level 3 devices in the list cost up
to $50,000 and support 60 - 1200 RSA-2048 signatures per second.
Multiple works on side-channel aacks show that extraction of
internal state is possible even without opening the enclosure of a
computer [32], and even without direct contact with it [30, 31, 33],
from a distance of up-to tens of meters.
In the following we propose using nano-satellites as a trusted,
isolated environment for secure computation.
1.2 CubeSats
e CubeSat reference design was proposed in 1999 [34] as a cheap
commercial o-the-shelf alternative to traditional expensive satel-
lites. e size of a CubeSat 1U is 10 × 10 × 10 cm, and it weights
less than 1.33 kg. As of June 24th 2017, 699 CubeSats have been
launched to orbit [13], with many active companies in the eld
generating a total revenue of $2B in 2014 [15]. CubeSats are mostly
used for academic research, however, many disruptive technologies
emerged around them recently. Increased production volume, and
reduction in the cost of launching to orbit, have been driving the
cost of launching a CubeSat down in the recent years. Furthermore,
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Figure 1: LibreCube: an open-source CubeSat design.
many open-source CubeSat designs exist today (see gure 1), open-
ing the possibilities for innovative solutions that only a decade ago
were not available.
1.3 Trusted Execution in Space
Currently, objects in the outer-space are hard to access physically1.
However, they can communicate with one another, as well as
with terrestrial base-stations. Outer-space can therefore serve as a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), providing strong isolation
guarantees, that as of today are very unlikely to be violated even
by state-level adversaries. While anti-satellite weapons have been
successfully tested [1], they are currently able, at most, to destroy
a satellite, but not to capture it. In a security jargon, destruction
constitutes a denial-of-service (DoS) aack.
1.3.1 Physical Protection and Isolation in Space. It is very expen-
sive to physically access a satellite launched into space. Although
launching a satellite into space is inexpensive, a rendezvous with
one in order to access its hardware is still a dicult mission that
requires great expertise and high-end equipment. However, as the
cost of space exploration drops, this capability may becomemore ac-
cessible. However, even if we will not be able to completely prevent
physical access, we can know that such access was aempted and
revoke that particular satellite as a reliable root-of-trust. e North
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD [14]), since 1958,
has been continuously mapping near-space to identify the course of
all objects. NORAD uses a network of ground-based radar systems
and telescopes to accurately determine and predict the trajectory
of objects of all sizes, as small as a baseball. NORAD’s data is freely
available online. A physical protection layer will involve daily
monitoring of the NORAD database (and others) to identify objects
which approach our satellite.
1.3.2 Pre-launch Physical Protection. If the adversary gets access
to the satellite prior to launch, it could tamper with the spacecra’s
hardware and soware. One way to make the solution tamper-
evident2 is to coat the computer with kapton tape, and measure
the satellite’s inertial moment prior to launch. e measurement
1Although we can imagine a dierent situation in the future with advances in mobility
in space.
2Meaning, it is easy to see that it has been tampered with (which is a common measure
in traditional hardware security modules).
is compared to the observed rotation rate of the satellite once in
orbit. It can be measured by tracking the antennas range-rate as
the satellite revolves[37], or via direct imaging of the satellite (de-
pending on launch conguration). By measuring the rotation rate
changes, we can estimate satellite’s actual moment of inertia [29]
and verify it is identical to the expected one, measured prior to
launch. Tampering with the coated hardware, or adding new one,
inevitably changes the moment of inertia. Further analysis and
simulations are required to assess the constraints of this method.
Although it is possible to reintroduce the original inertial moment,
it is extremely dicult to do within the time window of a launch
eort. In addition, during a launch, the vibrations induced on the
satellite from the rocket are likely to shake apart and destroy any
component that was not properly installed and tested for vibrations.
2 SPACE-HSM
We propose a design for a system that can serve as a certicate
authority (CA). It builds on traditional PKI, combined with the more
recent concept of Certicate Transparency [36]. We use certicate
transparency logs to prevent a powerful aacker, who gains access
to the communication channel with the CubeSat, from obtaining
forged certicates, similar to the infamous DigiNotar incident [7].
2.1 System Denition
Our system consists of the following entities (see Figure 2):
(1) A root-of-trust R provided by the SpaceHSM satellite. e
SpaceHSM handles certicate signing requests, and con-
stantly updates a cryptographic accumulator – a one-way
membership function that enables proving inclusion in
an append-only log, and, in our case, represents the com-
plete history of signed requests. e accumulator value is
constantly transmied as the satellite orbits.
(2) A terrestrial ground station G that authenticates to the
satellite and delegates requests for certicate signing.
(3) A public append-only certicate log L (similar to Certi-
cate Transparency [36]) that includes the history of all
signed certicates. We expect to have a match between
the accumulator published by the SpaceHSM and the one
computed over the certicate log.
(4) A verierV that is presented with a certicate, and checks
whether it is valid.
2.2 reat model (without DoS protection)
As a rst step, we state a simplied threat model that demonstrates
security but does not consider denial-of-service aacks in the pres-
ence of adversaries that can communicate with the satellite.
First and foremost, we assume that our space-based hardware
is tamper-proof and the access to it is restricted to a well-dened
satellite communication channel3. No physical access to the satel-
lite is possible, as we argue in section 1.3.1. We consider a powerful
adversary that is occasionally able to gain access to all terrestrial
infrastructure, and circumvent all physical security solutions such
3Satellites oen support a command that dumps and transmits all soware and data
to ground station. We assume no such command is supported in ours.
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Figure 2: e SpaceHSM System.
as locally installed traditional HSM machines, etc. It can temporar-
ily obtain wide control of servers connected to the network. e
aacker gains temporary access to the communication channel
with the SpaceHSM satellite, which enables her to issue requests to
sign forged certicates.
Moreover, we assume that the aacker (and everyone else) has
full visibility of the soware running on the SpaceHSM, and full
read-access to code and data prior to the satellite launch. Finally, we
assume that spoong transmission from a particular satellite over
a considerable period of time, and at many geographic locations
(ground stations) is hard4.
2.3 Protocol description
Bootstrap. Once launched, the SpaceHSM satellite generates a
private/public key-pair, and starts broadcasting the public key. Once
enough ground stations agree on the transmied public key, we
consider the system online. Consensus between ground stations can
be reached via Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols (see for instance
[26]), or by relying on a public-key infrastructure (PKI). Security of
this stage follows from our assumption regarding the diculty of
spoong communication from the satellite over time and location.
Boosting trust. An extension of this proposal considers multiple
SpaceHSM satellites on dierent orbits. When two satellites are in
line-of-sight of one another, they can exchange aestations of their
respective public keys. en, each one of them can broadcast the
signed aestation, increasing the trust in the public key identity.
Certicate Request. A request to sign a certicate is transmied
to the SpaceHSM, encrypted under its public key for privacy. e
SpaceHSM generates a signed certicate, and updates an accumu-
lator representing the history of all signature requests. We use
a constant-size accumulator, which suits well the present band-
width and storage constraints. A Merkle hash-tree [38], or an RSA
accumulator [23], can serve the purpose.
It is important that the certicate is actually signed, in addi-
tion to updating the accumulator since it guarantees to anyone
4Essentially it would require a satellite with a similar orbit. However, NORAD would
alert about any such existing satellite.
presented with the signed certicate, that the SpaceHSM updated
its accumulator. at, in turn, guarantees that any inconsistency
would have been noticed by monitoring parties.
Certicate Verication. Anyone presented with the signed cer-
ticate can verify its authenticity using the public key broadcast at
the bootstrap stage.
Certicate Log Update. We expect every signed certicate to
be submied to the publicly accessible certicate log. When log
server L receives a new signed certicate, it veries the signature
using R’s public key, and appends it to the log. Anyone can then
compute an accumulator over the log and compare it to the one
being broadcast by the SpaceHSM R. We call such parties monitors.
2.3.1 Security. Security and trust stem from correspondence
between the accumulator value transmied by the SpaceHSM to the
value that is can be computed over the publicly readable terrestrial
certicate log. An adversary may be able to take over a ground
station and request to sign a forged certicate that is not subse-
quently submied to the public terrestrial certicates log. However,
in that case, the SpaceHSM’s accumulator is updated to a new value,
resulting in a mismatch that would be readily noticed by the log
monitors.
2.4 reat model (with DoS)
is extended threat model considers Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-
tacks on the system. e protocol in section 2.3 enables anyone
who can communicate with the satellite to request the SpaceHSM
to sign a certicate. Failure to submit the signed certicate to the
log results in an inconsistency between the publicly computeable
accumulator and the one being broadcast by the SpaceHSM. Such a
mismatch results in a service disruption. Without appending the
adversary’s certicate to the log we cannot synchronize it with the
state of the SpaceHSM. We therefore need a reset procedure for the
SpaceHSM.
We assume that the ground station and the satellite establish
a secure communication channel, using a shared secret key. e
adversary is occasionally able to steal this shared key, which results
in a disruption to the service. In this threat model, the adversary
has no access to the SpaceHSM prior to the launch. Finally we
assume the existence of a secure oine storage on earth.
2.5 Protection against adversarial requests
is measure addresses the case of an adversary that aempts to
cause denial of service by frequently issuing certicate signing
requests and transmiing them to the satellite. We stress that even
if such an incident occurs, it has no eect on the trustworthiness
of the certicates signed by the SpaceHSM. is procedure is only
for the sake of preventing DoS aacks by parties that are normally
not authorized to send certicate signing requests directly.
One straightforward solution is to have the SpaceHSM broadcast
every signed certicate, such that it is visible to all certicate log
servers, instead of returning it via the private channel accessible
only to the ground-station. In the following, we suggest another
alternative.
We propose a reset procedure when a mismatch between the
satellite broadcast and the active log is encountered. A random seed
3
Component Model Name Notes
Structure 1U CubeSat
OBC Cube Computer [6] ARM Cortex-M3
Power system CS 1U Bundle A 10 Whr baery
Solar panels Azurspace panels [5] On all 6 sides
Transceiver ISIS VHF/UHF [17] Full-duplex
Antennas ISIS dipole
Table 1: Bill of materials.
is generated prior to launch and a cryptographic pseudo-random
number generator (PRG) is seeded. e state of the PRG is pro-
grammed intro the SpaceHSM, and is used to derive the rst shared
symmetric key. is state is also stored in a secure and inaccessible
oine terrestrial storage. e oine storage prevents any online
aacker from accessing the seed. When an inconsistency is noticed,
we fetch the stored PRG state and use it to generate the next key. If
the SpaceHSM fails to decrypt the channel using the i-th (current)
key, it generates the i + 1 key and aempts decryption, in order to
automatically identify the state transition. e previous certicate
log is no longer extended with new certicate and its state is frozen.
Instead, L initializes a new log that is extended with new certi-
cates signed aer the key transition. e old log is still accessible,
and enables verifying inclusion of certicates signed prior to the
key transition.
3 IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Space Segment Hardware
We propose to use commercial o-the-shelf CubeSat parts that
were tested in space. e satellite is launched to a Sun Synchronous
Orbit (SSO), which is a common design choice for CubeSats. Table 1
provides a bill of materials, and Figure 3 provides a candidate CAD
design.
e main on-board computer (OBC) is a Cube Computer [6],
consisting of a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 with 4MB Flash memory
for code storage, and 2 × 1MB SRAM memory for data storage. In
our design, we connect it to an external 48MHz clock. e Cube
Computer underwent radiation testing and was qualied for space
missions. Its error detection and correction (EDAC) hardware is
able to detect and correct Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single Event
Latch (SEL). By referring to published pricings of the components
in Table 1, we estimate that the marginal cost for building and
launching a SpaceHSM satellite to polar low Earth orbit is on the
order of 170,000 USD, or about 95,000 USD per HSM, if two are
bundled together into one satellite . It is higher, but comparable to
prices of other HSMs on the market that provide FIPS 140-2 Level
4 physical security. As we can see in Figure 3, we have enough
space to accommodate 2 independent (except for power supply)
HSMs, each with its own antenna, transceiver and computer in one
CubeSat.
3.2 Power Budget
In a typical SSO orbit, satellites have 45 minutes of daylight and 45
minutes of night-time, where the satellite is in the Earth’s shadow
(eclipse).
VHF and UHF Antennas 
Electrical Power System 
On Board Computer 
Battery 
Transducer 
Payload Space 
Figure 3: Proposed satellite CAD model (solar panels and
secondary structure are not shown).
Daylight Input Power Generation. e satellite will be powered
using 6 high-end solar panels with 30% eciency [5]. e total
average power input is computed (similarly to [21]) to be 3.82[W ].
Daytime Power Consumption. ree components contribute to
the daytime power consumption: the on-board computer, with an
average of 0.2[W ] [6]; the transceiver, which consumes 1.7[W ] dur-
ing transmission and 0.2[W ] while receiving [17], and given a duty
cycle of 30% at transmission, results in average power consumption
of 0.65[W ]; and nally baery recharging aer night operation,
which consumes 0.85[W ].
e total consumption by a single SpaceHSM is 1.7[W ], which
is 44% of the generated power, meaning the satellite has enough
power to sustain two SpaceHSMs.
Night-time Power Consumption. At night, the satellite draws
power from a baery to operate both the transceiver and the on-
board computer with the same power consumption as in daylight:
0.85[W ]. In 45 min of nighime, the satellite consumes 0.64[W ·hr ]
drawn from the 10[W · hr ] baery. A satellite’s depth of discharge
is very low (less then 10%), which guarantees long baery life to
support a satellite in orbit for several years [18].
3.3 Link Budget and Bit Rates
We consider a typical certicate signing request size of 2.5 KBytes
transmied to the satellite, and a 256 byte long RSA-2048 signature
and a 32 byte long accumulator using a SHA-256 hash, broadcast
in response. We assume a standard CubeSat datalink using the
AX.25 protocol [2]. An AX.25 frame adds a maximum overhead of
35 bytes, that wraps 256 bytes of data (Info eld) [3]. 5 bytes of
the Info eld are used as a message header [4]. We are le with
251 bytes per packet available for custom data. erefore, for each
certicate request, the SpaceHSM receives 11 AX.25 packets (24,000
bit) and sends one AX.25 packet (600 bit).
We do not elaborate on the link budget since our transducer was
successfully tested in SSO, with a standard armature radio ground
station. According to [17], we expect an uplink of 1200bps - enough
for one certicate request every 20 seconds. e downlink rate of
2400 bps at a 30% duty cycle enables sending a reply every second.
Due to orbital mechanics, we can communicate with the satellite
for 10min every 90min using Svalbard ground station.
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ese rates can be improved in the future by a factor of 1,000 by
using an S-Band transceiver capable of uplink rates of 2 Mbps [8].
However, using it, requires a monopole / dipole S-Band antenna
and a suitable ground station. ey can be custom-ordered, but are
not yet widely available commercially for CubeSats. We believe
that this technology will be widely used within a few years, which
would enable handling 50 certicate signing requests per second.
3.4 Soware
SpaceHSM requires crypto algorithms, including symmetric en-
cryption (AES-128 and AES-256) and, depending on the chosen
PKI algorithms, RSA-2048 and RSA-4096 signatures, ECDSA sig-
natures, and Curve25519. Due to limited resources we use a small
cryptographic library. To give a few examples: TweetNaCl [24] is
a tiny cryptographic library with compiled binary size of 11 KB,
support around 40 RSA-2048 decryptions per second on an Arm
Cortex M3. mbedTLS [12], while larger, is very functional and
still ts within our RAM budget. Its compiled binary takes 125 KB.
Another alternative is the RTOS ready SharkSSL library, that was
specically benchmarked on ARM Cortex M3 [16]. Its binary size
is approximately 15 KB. Finally, WolfSSL [20] is a small commercial
open-source library that supports TLS 1.3, ChaCha20, Curve25519
in addition to the standard crypto algorithms.
3.5 Fault protection
It is important to protect cryptographic protocols from random (or
injected) faults [25]. While random faults can potentially be caused
by radiation in space, the tests mentioned in section 3.1 show that
all bit-ips (SEU) are identied by the EDAC, and are corrected.
Eectively, it implies that random faults are very unlikely to occur
during the lifespan of the SpaceHSM. Faults can potentially be
injected by heating the satellite using a laser beam. Nevertheless, we
protect against fault-aacks on signature algorithms by verifying
the computed signature.
4 ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS
Our proposal has signicant advantages over terrestrial comput-
ers in the ability to isolate, and to protect against physical access.
However, its drawback is the relatively low communication band-
width, as well as the relatively limited processing power, due to
usage of micro-processors. Notably, the link is not symmetric –
the boleneck is the uplink to the satellite, which precludes up-
loading large amounts of data to the satellite for computing in an
isolated environment. In classic satellite applications, the downlink
rate is usually the boleneck, rather than the uplink. erefore
most existing products are tailored to have high downlink at the
expense of a high uplink rate. Further research is needed to beer
understand how uplink rate can be improved at the expense of a
lower downlink rate. Additional applications and implementations
of secure and tamper proof computing in space may include:
Trusted Public Parameter Generator. Cryptographic schemes
oen rely on a trusted setup, that occurs once, and outputs common
public parameters. Any secret values generated during the setup
must be “forgoen” aer, and remain inaccessible. e SpaceTEE
platform, with its support for random number generation and cryp-
tographic functionality, is a perfectly suitable party for executing
such algorithms.
Trusted Party for Cryptographic Protocols. Many crypto-
graphic protocols (electronic voting, privacy-preserving aggrega-
tion) require a trusted party, that performs a certain computation
without revealing the internal state, and that cannot be corrupted
by an adversary. Our CubeSat, loaded with suitable soware can
potentially be such a party. Currently, it suits only moderate work-
loads, which can however be useful for certain protocols. A sim-
ple e-voting protocol involves submiing inputs encrypted under
an additively-homomorphic encryption scheme. e inputs are
”summed-up”, resulting in an encryption of the aggregate value. A
trusted party then decrypts the ciphertext and outputs the result.
Such a trusted party can be implemented using SpaceTEE.
Trusted Mining. e SpaceTEE can serve as a trusted miner for
cryptocurrencies similar to Bitcoin and Ethereum. A major concern
in cryptocurrencies, is that miners with a large percentage of the
hashing power can adopt a non-standard mining strategy in an
aempt to prot beyond the standard transaction fees [27, 28, 35].
For instance, they can ignore the most recent block, etc. Execution
in a trusted environment can guarantee strict adherence to a certain
mining strategy, decided prior to launch.
Trusted Timestamping enables securely keeping track of cre-
ation and modication of documents and media, and can be use-
ful for instance for copyright purposes. A client can request the
SpaceHSM to sign a message containing a hash of the document
and a timestamp at the time of signing, and later reveal the original
document, i.e. the hash function preimage, claiming ownership.
5 RELATEDWORK
e project on rstspacebank.com [10] sets to provide a secure
and decentralized satellite banking platform. e website, unfor-
tunately, provides no further details beyond this short statement.
Laurie’s technical report on Certicate Transparency [36] provides
an excellent explanation of the motivation behind it and its design.
ere are various proposals for implementation of cryptographic
accumulators, starting with the original paper by Benaloh and de
Mare [23]. Tremel [39] provides a review of various accumulators,
and compares the performance of their real-world implementa-
tions. e following survey, [11], demonstrates new and emerging
applications for CubeSats.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a novel idea of using computational plat-
forms in space as a means to protect data from adversarial physical
access. We demonstrated one application of such tamper-proof
platform by showing how Hardware Security Modules for a PKI
ecosystem can be implemented using an inexpensive CubeSat that
can be built using readily available commercial o-the-shelf hard-
ware. A signicant impediment to using space-based tamper-proof
computation today, is the limited communication bandwidth to and
from the satellite, as well as the relatively low processing power.
However, in the near future signicant advancements can be done
in the eld.
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